Jorge Cortés


Frequency-driven market mechanisms for optimal dispatch in power networks
T. Stegink, A. Cherukuri, C. De Persis, A. J. van der Schaft, J. Cortés
Automatica, submitted


This paper studies real-time bidding mechanisms for economic dispatch and frequency regulation in electrical power networks described by topologies with edge-disjoint cycles. We consider a market administered by an independent system operator (ISO) where a group of strategic generators participate in a Bertrand game of competition. Generators bid prices at which they are willing to produce electricity. Each generator aims to maximize their profit, while the ISO seeks to minimize the total generation cost while respecting line flow limits and regulate the frequency of the system. We consider a continuous-time bidding process coupled with the swing dynamics of the network through the use of frequency as a feedback signal for the negotiation process. We analyze the stability of the resulting interconnected system, establishing frequency regulation and the convergence to a Nash equilibrium and optimal generation levels. Simulations illustrate our theoretical findings.


Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, University of California, San Diego
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